Army • Woke Agenda

DEI and the Death of Effective Military Command

19 December 2024

By retired Army Colonel Cynical Publius ( @CynicalPublius)

As Pete Hegseth’s nomination for Secretary of Defense moves forward, the matter of “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” (DEI) doctrines and practices in America’s military is a hot-button issue of significant importance.

Our media is awash with stories of “woke” generals and admirals, critiques of women in combat, awful tales of command selection board manipulations based on race or gender, and a generalized sense of uneasiness in the senior ranks of the Pentagon over perceived massive changes to take place once Trump and Hegseth are in charge.

However, this current DEI attention focuses almost exclusively on what is happening inside the five walls of the Pentagon and tends to ignore DEI’s most pernicious effect: the way it is obliterating command authority in tactical units in the field and warships at sea.

First, let me tell you how I figured out what is going on.

On X (formerly known as Twitter), I have an active account of about 130,000 followers. I know that number is much smaller than that of many other X influencers, but it’s enough to give me some reach.

My account focuses primarily on politics and culture, with a heavy emphasis on matters related to the U.S. military. That’s because I’m a retired Army colonel, and my views on military matters seem to resonate with veterans and active duty alike.

It is that community of military followers that has fully revealed to me the DEI cancer that is eating away at U.S. military leadership at all levels.

A few days ago, I posted an article from Military.com that truly shocked me. That article stated that in today’s Army, roughly half of the officers who are eligible for battalion command are refusing to even be considered for such command.

The article’s author, quoting official Army sources, stated that this was a function of officers being unwilling to take on the extraordinary time demands of being a battalion commander and out of a desire for a more sedate form of service for themselves and their families.

The article suggests that a career as a staff officer with retirement at 20 years is more palatable than the constant and powerful peacetime and wartime demands of commanding a battalion of many hundreds or thousands of soldiers, even if that decision prohibits ever reaching high rank.

I was shocked. As I posted on X:

“What is going on here? In the Army I grew up in, it was the almost uniform goal of the entire officer corps to become a battalion commander one day. It was the brass ring. It was the validation of all of your training and efforts, and it was the most rewarding job in your career. The only reason to hold tedious staff positions was so you could aspire to one day command a battalion. So now in 2024, officers are happy to wile away the years making PowerPoint slides and making sure the coffee is fresh, and they lack the desire to lead troops? Dear God. The rot in the culture is far worse than I imagined.”

(As background, in all of the military services, not just the Army, command at the O-5 level is the ultimate leadership experience. In the Army and Marine Corps, it means commanding a battalion as a lieutenant colonel. In the Air Force, it means commanding a squadron as a lieutenant colonel. In the Navy, it means commanding a combat warship at the similar O-5 rank of commander. It truly is the greatest reward for those who wish to lead and command, and it is usually the last time in a successful military career that you are down in the dirt (or the bilge) with the troops that you lead. It’s a special time, once coveted by the best leaders.)

I retired from active duty in 2007, so I was looking at this issue from my old-timer perspective. But that’s when X, as the “new news media,” did its job—suddenly my X comments and private messages were flooded with active duty and recently retired officers explaining to me that this phenomenon was not due to a desire to not be overworked (as suggested by the Army itself and the Pentagon-friendly author at Military.com) but was instead due to fear of DEI.

DEI has made O-5-level command a risky proposition where a male or a white officer lives in fear of an unfounded DEI complaint that would destroy not only his or her military career but the officer’s reputation as well.

The risk of such destruction is outweighing the desire to lead. This is a tragic result.

So let’s say you are a straight, white male Army battalion commander who has a subordinate who happens to be a racial or ethnic minority, or a female, or LGBTQ+.

Let’s also say that the subordinate is a poor performer to whom you give a poor efficiency report or is someone engaged in illegal activity that you prosecute under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Let’s say that such a poor performer or criminal then goes to the Inspector General (IG) and claims what you have done is motivated solely by racial, ethnic, or gender animus, or homophobia. (Or worse, a female soldier falsely claims you sexually assaulted her.)

Back in the day, all such a commander needed to do was show the facts surrounding the issue to the IG, and the IG would go away, satisfied.

But not today. Today, such claims tend to result in a presumption of guilt against the commander, which must be conclusively disproven.

As if that is not bad enough, there is a related concept here: so-called “counterproductive leadership.” Basically, counterproductive leadership is the idea that a leader’s actions are so toxic that he or she is not qualified to command.

Crazily, “counterproductive leadership” (or “toxic leadership”) can be evidenced merely by such abstract concepts as subordinates refusing to look a leader in the eye or leaders holding poor performers to account for their poor performance.

I’m fairly certain that iconic military leaders like George S. Patton and William “Bull” Halsey, Jr. would be considered purveyors of “counterproductive leadership” in today’s military environment, and mythical characters like Gunnery Sergeant Thomas Highway would likely be in the stockade.

“Counterproductive leadership” then gets linked to something else: “loss of confidence” by a commander’s chain of command. This is the idea that a commander’s superiors relieved him or her from command for unspecified reasons—including “counterproductive leadership.”

In the past ten years, an unprecedented number of senior leaders (O-5 and above) have been relieved from command for this very “loss of confidence” reason. (Do a simple Google search and you’ll see what I mean.)

So let me please break down for you how this is all connected. Despite the fact that many commanders are, in fact, relieved for legitimately horrific reasons, many others are relieved according to the following, specious chain of events:

  1. A unit commander disciplines a minority, female, or LGBTQ+ subordinate who legitimately committed some form of wrongdoing or was a poor performer.
  2. The subordinate then files a race/ethnicity/gender/religion/sexuality discrimination complaint against the unit commander with the IG, claiming the discipline was unwarranted and was actually motivated by racial/ethnic/gender/religious/LGBTQ+ animus.
  3. The unit commander is presumed guilty until proven innocent.
  4. The IG then determines the unit commander is innocent.
  5. Despite the IG’s determination, the unit commander’s higher chain of command determines that “counterproductive leadership” was the cause of the unfounded and disproven IG complaint—a complaint that presumably would never have occurred had the unit commander displayed “productive leadership.”
  6. “Counterproductive leadership” causes the unit commander’s chain of command to determine it has “lost confidence” in the unit commander.
  7. The unit commander is then relieved from command duties by his or her higher chain of command due to such loss of confidence.
  8. Stars and Stripes and Military.com then publicly report the ex-commander’s relief for cause.
  9. The ex-commander then becomes depressed and starts drinking heavily; the ex-commander cannot find a civilian job because his reputation has been publicly destroyed; the ex-commander’s wife and kids leave him; the now-broke ex-commander moves into a seedy one-bedroom apartment in San Francisco’s Tenderloin district, where he is later arrested for fentanyl distribution.

(OK, I made #9 up—but I’m sure you can see how that fear of reputational destruction is valid and real.)

But that sequence of #1 through #8 that I just told you about? It’s real, without any exaggeration. There are senior folks I know personally who have suffered from this exact phenomenon.

However, I’m not just speaking on this subject from personal knowledge (and back to X as the real news purveyor of the modern era), as my X feed has been overwhelmed with expressions of just what I wrote above.

I have written some controversial X takes before that have garnered millions of views, but none of those resulted in so many detailed recountings of the exact same tale of woe as my discussion on this command issue did.

My first comes from a current DoD member who is uniquely qualified in their duty position to understand the issue of O-5 command selection and the current related problems (and therefore said person requests anonymity):

“I work in a position where I encounter many of the O-5s and E-9s in that group [for prospective command]. An alarming amount of them seem low-key dreading facing the “weaponized investigation” culture that is currently pervasive. Combine that with the paltry manning (but perception from higher that everything must still get done as if they were 100%), and it is absolutely not surprising to me that the command opt-in is down.”

Then this from a recently retired Army colonel:

“100% accurate about jeopardy for commanders. I spent 75% of my last deployment conducting investigations. Did 78 AR 15-6 investigations in 9 months. The biggest problem are the sharp complaints and the “counterproductive leadership complaints.” Those are used for revenge and get out of jail. The “counterproductive leadership” complaints are virtually impossible to counter and even if you do no one escapes unscathed. Finally the religious exemptions for grooming and uniform standards are an EO trap—no matter how ridiculous the claim you have to be crazy to recommend denial because who are you to say it’s not a “sincerely held religious belief?” Deny it and you are prejudiced. Many of the active component majors and lieutenant colonels I worked with said they had zero interest in battalion command or brigade command because they were terrified of the endless investigations. It’s much less of a problem in the National Guard and USAR… until you mobilize. Then it’s the same problem.”

These are merely two of many such communications I have received. Are you sensing a pattern here?

Let me break it down one more time, as it was news to me when I finally figured it out, and it is probably news to anybody else who has not been in the U.S. military fairly recently. Here it is.

Our senior civilian and military leadership in the Department of Defense have created a DEI climate across all military services where leadership at the key level of O-5 command is impossible.

As a result, the best-qualified O-5s are running from command out of a legitimate fear of life-destroying lies that will stain their reputations like a scarlet letter.

The most disturbing part of all of this, however, is what the DEI cancer does at the tactical unit level to combat readiness.

A military unit or warship cannot function as a combat-effective force when its commander lives in the shadow of the fear of unfounded subordinate retribution. It cannot.

It is as if there is constant fear of mutiny or a gnawing sense of uneasiness that the unit you command is populated by an unknown number of zampolit.

Leadership and discipline fail, unit cohesion crumbles, and the entire system disintegrates as combat effectiveness evaporates. Worst of all, the service members in such a combat-ineffective unit or ship will suffer—and some will die—as a result.

One more thing: if the best and brightest are running in fear from command, who is taking command?

Answer: the “woke,” DEI-compliant officers; and because they are the ones taking command, they will necessarily one day become the officers at the top of the pyramid who make all the key military decisions. Or perhaps they are already there.

All of this leads to a very simple and devastating conclusion: if U.S. military commanders cannot command effectively, how can the U.S. military ever again win a war?

Pete Hegseth, please unwind the tyranny and combat ineffectiveness of this DEI cancer at all levels, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff all the way down to the infantry private walking point. Please. Our nation’s future depends upon it.

Cynical Publius is the nom de plume of a retired U.S. Army colonel, veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan, and reformed denizen of the Pentagon who is now a practicing corporate law attorney. You can follow Cynical Publius on X at @CynicalPublius.

First published on American Greatness

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